In In re Akhlaghpour, No. 24-2625 (9th Cir. January 20, 2026), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (“Ninth Circuit”) reaffirmed that a bankruptcy court may grant leave under the Barton doctrine even after a related state court action has already been filed and decided in part. However, the Ninth Circuit made clear that such Barton doctrine approval must be narrowly tailored and cannot be used to revive claims dismissed by state courts or to authorize claims that were never subject to the Barton doctrine in the first place.
The appeal arose from a legal malpractice action filed by debtor Mehri Akhlaghpour (“Debtor”) against her former bankruptcy counsel in a Chapter 11 case. After a Chapter 11 trustee was appointed, Debtor’s properties were liquidated, and the case eventually closed. Years later, Debtor sued her former counsel in California state court for alleged malpractice relating to the bankruptcy filing and administration.
The state trial court dismissed the action under the Barton doctrine, holding that Debtor had failed to obtain leave of the bankruptcy court before suing court-approved bankruptcy counsel. Under the Barton doctrine, a person who sues a lawyer appointed by the bankruptcy court for acts done in the lawyer’s official capacity in a forum other than bankruptcy court must seek leave of the bankruptcy court to do so. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal partially reversed, holding that Barton applied to claims based on counsel’s actions as debtor-in-possession but not to alleged conduct occurring after the trustee’s appointment, when counsel no longer acted in an official bankruptcy capacity.
After the state appellate ruling, Debtor returned to bankruptcy court and sought leave under Barton to “continue” prosecuting the pending state court action. The bankruptcy court granted leave in part. On further appeal, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) vacated the order, concluding that granting Barton approval violated the Rooker-Feldman doctrine by effectively undermining the state court’s rulings. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a jurisdictional rule that bars lower federal courts from hearing appeals or review of state-court judgments (i.e., stops “state-court losers” from filing a new suit in federal court).
The Ninth Circuit reversed the BAP and held that the bankruptcy court’s decision to grant Barton leave did not violate the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that Barton approval merely removes a jurisdictional bar and does not, by itself, modify or overturn state court judgments. Accordingly, a debtor’s request for Barton leave—even after adverse state court rulings—does not amount to impermissible appellate review of state court decisions.
The Ninth Circuit also concluded that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in how it framed its Barton approval. Specifically: Barton approval cannot be read to revive claims already dismissed with prejudice by a state court. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that when a state court decision already exists, a bankruptcy court’s Barton order must be carefully limited to the jurisdictional issue and avoid implying that any substantive relief has been granted. In this case, the bankruptcy court erred by granting Barton approval for post-trustee-appointment claims that were not subject to the Barton doctrine at all.
This case provides important guidance for the limited application of the Barton doctrine. Barton approval may be sought even after a lawsuit has been filed; however, such approval does not retroactively validate claims that have already been dismissed and serves only to remove a jurisdictional obstacle on a prospective basis. Where state court rulings already exist, bankruptcy courts must therefore draft Barton orders with care to avoid any implication that they are altering, revisiting, or overriding those rulings. In addition, claims arising from conduct outside a court-appointed role should not be swept into Barton relief, as such claims are not subject to the doctrine in the first instance.